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Social costs enforce honesty of a dynamic signal of motivation [Royal Society Open Science]

Keywords : signalling, communication, colour, conventional signals, chameleons, physiological colour change

par Frédéric Magné - publié le

Understanding the processes that promote signal reliability may provide important insights into the evolution of diverse signalling strategies among species. The signals that animals use to communicate must comprise mechanisms that prohibit or punish dishonesty, and social costs of dishonesty have been demonstrated for several fixed morphological signals (e.g. colour badges of birds and wasps). The costs maintaining the honesty of dynamic signals, which are more flexible and potentially cheatable, are unknown. Using an experimental manipulation of the dynamic visual signals used by male veiled chameleons (Chamaeleo calyptratus) during aggressive interactions, we tested the idea that the honesty of rapid colour change signals is maintained by social costs.(...)

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